Does Expertise Reduce Rates of Inattentional Blindness? A Meta-Analysis.

Inattentional blindness occurs when one fails to notice a fully visible stimulus because one's attention is on another task. Researchers have suggested that expertise at this other task should reduce rates of inattentional blindness. However, research on the topic has produced mixed findings. To gain clarity on the issue, we meta-analyzed the extant studies (K = 14; N = 1153). On average, experts showed only a slight reduction in rates of inattentional blindness: 62% of novices experienced inattentional blindness compared to 56% of experts, weighted odds ratio = 1.33, 95% CI [0.78, 2.28]. The relevance of the stimuli to the experts' domain of expertise showed no notable moderating effects. The low number of the included studies, and the small sample sizes of the original studies, weaken our conclusions. Nonetheless, when taken together, the available evidence provides little support for any reliable influence of expertise on rates of inattentional blindness.

Subjective likelihood and the construal level of future events: A replication study of Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, and Alony (2006).

C. J. Wakslak, Y. Trope, N. Liberman, and R. Alony (2006) examined the effect of manipulating the likelihood of future events on level of construal (i.e., mental abstraction). Over 7 experiments, they consistently found that subjectively unlikely (vs. likely) future events were more abstractly (vs. concretely) construed. This well-cited, but understudied finding has had a major influence on the construal level theory (CLT) literature: Likelihood is considered to be 1 of 4 psychological distances assumed to influence mental abstraction in similar ways (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Contrary to the original empirical findings, we present 2 close replication attempts (N = 115 and N = 120; the original studies had N = 20 and N = 34) that failed to find the effect of likelihood on construal level. Bayesian analyses provided diagnostic support for the absence of an effect. In light of the failed replications, we present a meta-analytic summary of the accumulated evidence on the effect. It suggests a strong trend of declining effect sizes as a function of larger samples. These results call into question the previous conclusion that likelihood has a reliable influence on construal level. We discuss the implications of these findings for CLT and advise against treating likelihood as a psychological distance until further tests have established the relationship. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

The mental representation of true and false intentions: a comparison of schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent tasks.

True and false intentions (i.e., lies and truths about one's future actions) is a relatively new research topic, despite the high societal value of being able to predict future criminal behavior (e.g., in the case of an alleged terrorist attack). The current study examined how true and false intentions are mentally represented - the knowledge of which can aid the development of new deception detection methods. Participants (N = 151) were asked either to form a true intention about a future task (i.e., retrieve objects from an office) or to form a false intention about the same task (i.e., prepare a cover story about retrieving objects from an office) to conceal their actual intention (i.e., leave a secret note in the office). The schema consistency of the task was manipulated by presenting participants with a list of office supplies (schema-consistent) or random objects (schema-inconsistent) to be retrieved from the office. The abstractness of mental construal was operationalized as the number of categories used by participants to organize the task-relevant objects into thematic groups. We predicted, based on construal level theory (CLT) and action identification theory, that participants would mentally represent true intentions more concretely (i.e., use a larger number of categories) than false intentions, particularly for schema-inconsistent (versus schema-consistent) future tasks. The results of the study lend no support for these predictions. Instead, a Bayesian analysis revealed strong evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. The findings indicate that predictions from CLT do not readily translate into deception contexts. The results are discussed in light of recent failed attempts to apply CLT to research on true and false intentions, and highlight the need for alternative approaches to the topic.

Sex differences in personality are larger in gender equal countries: Replicating and extending a surprising finding.

Sex differences in personality have been shown to be larger in more gender equal countries. We advance this research by using an extensive personality measure, the IPIP-NEO-120, with large country samples (N > 1000), from 22 countries. Furthermore, to capture the multidimensionality of personality we measure sex differences with a multivariate effect size (Mahalanobis distance D). Results indicate that past research, using univariate measures of effect size, have underestimated the size of between-country sex differences in personality. Confirming past research, there was a strong correlation (r = .69) between a country's sex differences in personality and their Gender Equality Index. Additional analyses showed that women typically score higher than men on all five trait factors (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness), and that these relative differences are larger in more gender equal countries. We speculate that as gender equality increases both men and women gravitate towards their traditional gender roles.

Drawing what lies ahead: False intentions are more abstractly depicted than true intentions.

The aim of this study was to examine how people mentally represent and depict true and false statements about claimed future actions-so-called true and false intentions. On the basis of construal level theory, which proposes that subjectively unlikely events are more abstractly represented than likely ones, we hypothesized that false intentions should be represented at a more abstract level than true intentions. Fifty-six hand drawings, produced by participants to describe mental images accompanying either true or false intentions, were rated on level of abstractness by a second set of participants (N = 117) blind to the veracity of the intentions. As predicted, drawings of false intentions were rated as more abstract than drawings of true intentions. This result advances the use of drawing-based deception detection techniques to the field of true and false intentions and highlights the potential for abstractness as a novel cue to deceit.

Do True and False Intentions Differ in Level of Abstraction? A Test of Construal Level Theory in Deception Contexts.

The aim was to examine how people mentally represent alleged future actions-their true and false intentions. In two experiments, participants were asked to either tell the truth (i.e., express true intentions) or lie (i.e., express false intentions) about performing future tasks. Drawing on Construal Level Theory, which proposes that psychologically distant events are more abstractly construed than proximal ones, it was predicted that liars would have more abstract mental representations of the future tasks than truth tellers, due to differences in hypotheticality (i.e., the likelihood of the future tasks occurring). Construal level was measured by a video segmentation task (Experiment 1, N = 125) and preference for abstract or concrete descriptions of tasks (Experiment 2, N = 59). Veracity had no effect on construal level. Speaking against our initial predictions, the data indicate that true and false intentions are construed at similar levels of abstraction. The results are discussed in the light of Construal Level Theory and the emerging psycho-legal research on true and false intentions.

Personality traits across countries: Support for similarities rather than differences.

In the current climate of migration and globalization, personality characteristics of individuals from different countries have received a growing interest. Previous research has established reliable differences in personality traits across countries. The present study extends this research by examining 30 personality traits in 22 countries, based on an online survey in English with large national samples (NTotal = 130,602). The instrument used was a comprehensive, open-source measure of the Five Factor Model (FFM) (IPIP-NEO-120). We postulated that differences in personality traits between countries would be small, labeling this a Similarities Hypothesis. We found support for this in three stages. First, similarities across countries were observed for model fits for each of the five personality trait structures. Second, within-country sex differences for the five personality traits showed similar patterns across countries. Finally, the overall the contribution to personality traits from countries was less than 2%. In other words, the relationship between a country and an individual's personality traits, however interesting, are small. We conclude that the most parsimonious explanation for the current and past findings is a cross-country personality Similarities Hypothesis.

Partners under Pressure: Examining the Consistency of True and False Alibi Statements.

How to discriminate between honest and deceptive alibi statements holds great legal importance. We examined this issue from the perspective of group deception. Our goals were to (a) compare the consistency between the statements of guilty and innocent suspects and those of their respective alibi witnesses, and (b) to examine the moderating role of object-salience on the level of consistency between their statements. Pairs of truth-tellers provided honest testimonies. Pairs of liars were divided into perpetrators and alibi witnesses. Statements of lying pairs were considerably more consistent than the statements of truth-telling pairs. In addition, both truth-tellers and liars showed lower levels of within-group consistency when recalling less salient details about an event. However, truth-tellers' consistency levels were considerably more affected by salience than were liars' consistency levels. These findings contribute to deception theory and have important implications for the real-life task of distinguishing between true and false alibi statements. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Corrigendum: Detecting Deception within Small Groups: A Literature Review.

[This corrects the article on p. 1012 in vol. 7, PMID: 27445957.].

Markers of good planning behavior as a cue for separating true and false intent.

The study adds to the growing body of research on true and false intentions, traditionally a neglected area of deception research. Specifically, the goal was to examine the claim that statements of true intent would be colored by markers of good planning behavior to a greater extent than statements of false intent. Participants (N = 132) were divided into truth tellers and liars. Truth tellers were given a neutral task to plan and carry out. Liars were given a mock crime to plan and carry out and were also told to plan a cover story to be used in case they were apprehended. The cover story (i.e., liars' false intention) was to be thematically similar to the truth tellers' task. Following the planning phase, but before the task commenced, participants were interviewed about their intent. Transcribed interviews were coded for markers of good planning behavior (e.g., effective time allocation, implementation intention related utterances, and likelihood to speak of potential problems). As predicted, truth tellers' statements were colored to a higher degree than those of liars by such markers. The results earmark this approach as a viable direction for future research.